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EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW REFORM IN NEW ZEALAND
Richard A. Epstein*
A ROUGH ROAD TO REFORM
My task on this occasion is to talk about law reform in New
Zealand, which invites you, the audience, to ask what a nice boy from
Brooklyn knows about this subject. But in fact there is a close synergy
between my previous work and the topic at hand. During the 1980s I wrote
two controversial articles (and one rejoinder) on labor and employment
law.' Partly in consequence of my free-market message, in 1990, 1995, and
1999, I traveled to New Zealand at the behest of the New Zealand Business
Round Table to speak about these subjects among others. I was their
foreign carpetbagger, as it were, who was asked to bring his own
perspective - a libertarian, philosophical outlook informed by a
consequentialist, intellectual orientation - to bear on the problems of the
day. I addressed many topics on those visits, for there were many areas of
economic policy that were highly contested at the time. But one recurrent
theme on all three visits was the state of New Zealand employment law.
My purpose was to persuade New Zealanders, and the people in charge of
New Zealand's political institutions, to engage in what the 19t" Century
lawyers used to call "liberalization" of their labor laws, that is, that the
classical regime of freedom of contract should govern employment
relations. That project rested on the explicit assumption that New Zealand
should remove most, if not all, the regulations and collective bargaining
from its current law.
There was, actually, an ironic touch to all of this. I have known
only one prime minister in my entire life - Geoffrey Palmer, who was then
not only a torts professor who had from time to time visited the University
$ University of Chicago, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law;
Peter and Kirsten Bradford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. This lecture was given
on January 24, 2001 at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio.
1 Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal
Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983); Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and
Reality: A Rejoinder to Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435 (1983); Richard
A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CM. L. REV. 947 (1984).
2 The published lectures include: Richard A. Epstein, Age Discrimination and
Employment Law (1999); Richard A. Epstein, Restoring Sanctity of Contract in
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of Iowa, but also prime minister of New Zealand. Part of the goal of my
1990 visit to New Zealand was to build the case against his Labor Party, in
the hopes that New Zealand's National Party would introduce a leader more
receptive to their reform programs. That change did take place in national
elections in the fall of 1990.
Although I felt very strange about this personal connection, it gave
me a chance to observe over the better part of a decade the full cycle that
had developed in New Zealand, including those actions and policies that
had been entrenched before the push for reform. I am going to recount
some of this history for you. Before I start addressing the New Zealand
reform, however, I think it would be useful to talk briefly about how we
think about the law reform movement generally in the United States, and
why a comparative approach is useful for understanding the New Zealand
situation.
In dealing with law reform, the natural target for discussions is of
course the United States, where the progress toward reform, whether for
better or for worse, faces a powerful set of institutional obstacles that even
the most ardent reformer cannot easily over come. The first of these is that
we have a federal system so that law reform has to come either piecemeal at
the state level or after Herculean struggle at the federal level. At both the
state and federal levels, moreover, the organization of government slows
down reform. The complex committee structures, bicameralism,
presidential and gubernatorial vetoes, all contribute to a situation in which
the advantage goes to the status quo ante. We also invite judicial
challenges to the legislation and regulation on a wide variety of
administrative law and constitutional grounds. The history of tort reform
shows the huge scars of battle, and the ability to obtain any kind of reform
in an area as contentious as labor law is even more problematic. The bias to
the status quo ante is evident.
For these reasons, it is instructive to look at the pace and style of
law reform in countries that have very different political constitutions. For
these purposes, New Zealand is about as good a contrast to the United
States as one can hope to see. It is a common law country in the sense that
it obviously inherited the English common law, to which it retains a much
closer affinity than does the United States. It is a small country with under
four million people. The system is not federal. The New Zealand
Parliament has a single house. There is a prime minister in Parliament,
which means (or at least meant until a system of proportionate
representation was introduced) that the dominant party can turn the law
around on a dime. The pace of law reform in New Zealand could be much
more rapid than in the United States - regardless of whether it moved the
law for better or for worse. So, one determinant of the rate of change -
which is not synonymous with "reform" - points to the potential for rapid
change in New Zealand, at least in those instances when change occurs.
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The second element that affects the rate of reform is the perceived
level of desperation with the particular problem at hand. When we "do"
reform in the United States, we work against the basic backdrop of
prosperity. Occasionally, you will see a degree of urgency with respect to
reform in the United States, as for example the current (as of 2002, and
perhaps not 2001) uproar over class actions, especially in places like
Mississippi. The level of dissatisfaction is a rough measure of the
anticipated gains from legal change; where it is high we can expect to see
both the effort and stout resistance to it. But in some fraction of cases, the
changes that are introduced could be substantial. But in most American
settings, the general aura of prosperity dulls the urgency for major reform
even in impacted sectors.
In comparison, when New Zealand engaged in its reform, the
country was experiencing some truly major-league problems. Back in the
mid-1980s, the nation was close to bankrupt and something very dramatic
had to be done before the country went into hock. So, when you combine
the motivation for reform with the existing government structure, New
Zealand exhibited the two ideal conditions for reform. The desperation that
concentrates attention on the problem, the political institutions capable - at
least at the time - of rapid orientation or re-orientation towards the
immediate perils at hand.
So that brings us to the earlier caveat: what it is exactly that you
mean by "reform." This is a problem of very different dimensions.
Clearly, the most obvious point about a reform is that it changes the status
quo. Quite literally, we "re-form" something so that it takes a new form.
That is the origin of the term, but law reform for most people has a more
high-minded purpose, so that it represents not just a change in, but also an
improvement in the structure or design of the law. Well, it is easy to
identify a change. It is rather more difficult for one to identify
improvements without some clear, substantive diagnosis about what is
wrong with the current system and what is right about the proposed change.
This theory also had to command at least a very strong consensus within the
society, if not unanimous consent, in order to be capable of adoption.
A CAPSULE HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND EMPLOYMENT LAW
In light of these background conditions - particularly in New
Zealand - it is difficult to secure a consensus that will move the law in
(what I regard to be) the proper direction. In order to set the background, it
is useful to offer a compressed review of the history of employment
legislation in New Zealand, which is marked by wide swings in official
policy. New Zealand's short-lived Employment Contracts Act (1991) (now
3 Employment Contracts Act, 1991 (N.Z.), available at http://rangi.knowledge-
basket.co.nzlgpacts/public/text/ 199 1/ar/022.html.
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gutted by the Employment Relations Act 2000)4 did much to liberalize in
the nineteenth century sense the world of employment relations. 5 The ECA
represented a sharp shift from previous New Zealand policy that in 1894
passed the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, under which unions
gave up on the right to strike in exchange for a regime of compulsory
arbitration.6  In 1936, New Zealand's first Labor Government made
unionization compulsory. In 1973, the Industrial Relations Act
distinguished what were called "disputes of interest" from "disputes of
right." The former covered negotiations of new deals, or the extension of
old contracts to new firns; the latter, individual grievances. The 1973 Act
allowed strikes for disputes of interest, i.e. over economic issues, but not of
right, i.e. disputes over the interpretation of individual contracts. By the
middle 1980s, the basic legal system gave unions for key privileges, which
Raymond Harbridge and Aaron Crawford summarized as follows:
The Industrial conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 established the
principles of wage fixing in New Zealand - conciliation and arbitration.
Those principles were based on four features: (i) multi-employer arbitral
awards which provided minimum terms and conditions of employment; (ii)
subsequent party clauses which, by law, extended blanket coverage of
awards over specified industries or occupations, regardless of whether they
had participated in the process of award negotiation; (iii) procedures
designed to make membership in trade unions compulsory; and (iv)
compulsory arbitration to settlement disputes of interest.7
The nationwide system of wage agreements came under siege
during the 1980s, when the New Zealand economy edged toward collapse.
At that time, the Labor Party (yes, the Labor Party), under the leadership of
Roger Douglas, scrapped all interest rate and exchange controls, floated the
New Zealand dollar, and eliminated subsidies for farming and industry,
simplified the tax system, and opened up air travel to private competition.
4 Employment Relations Act, 2000 (N.Z.), available at http://rangi.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/gpacts/public/text/ 2000/an/024.html.
5 For an employer view of this history, see Anne K. Knowles, The Employment
Contracts Act of 1991: An Employer History, 290 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 75 (1997).
6 Employment Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1894 (N.Z.); See J.A.B. O'KErE &
W.L. FARRANDS, INTRODUCTION TO NEw ZEALAND LABOR LAW 261 (1976) [hereinafter
O'K=E & FARRANDS]. For an account of the earlier history, see Gordon Anderson,
Interpreting The Employment Contracts Act: Are the Courts Undermining the Act?, 28 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 117, 119-120 (1997).
7 Raymond Harbridge & Aaron Crawford, The Impact of New Zealand's Employment
Contracts Act on Industrial Relations, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 235, 235 (1997). See Roger
Kerr, The New Zealand Employment Contracts Act: Its Enactment, Performance, and
Implications, 28 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 89, 91 (1997), for a similar account.
' ld. at 89.
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The reworking of its labor law came in the second wave of legislation,
which cumulated in the Employment Contracts Act 1991.
One notable feature of that Act was its cautious posture to
collective bargaining arrangements of the sort that dominate American law.
Critics of the ECA denounced it as an effort to curtail collective bargaining
in labor markets.9 But I think that it is more accurate to say that the statute
removed the built-in legislative tilt in favor of the system by adopting a
framework that allowed individual workers to accept or reject union
representation at will.10 The upshot was that any employer could always
negotiate direct with workers if both of them so chose. The ECA did not so
much as use the words "trade unions" in any of its provisions. Workers, as
it were, may choose to bargain through representatives, but were not
entitled to receive any special status under the law. Some flavor of the
ECA is found in one representative provision:
19. Individual employment contracts-
(1) Where there is no applicable collective employment contract, each
employee and the employer may enter into such individual
employment contract, as they think fit.
(2) Where there is an applicable collective employment contract, each
employee and the employer may negotiate terms and conditions on a
individual basis that are not inconsistent with any terms and
conditions of the applicable collective employment contract.
Yet the ECA did not achieve all the objectives sought by the
reformers. In particular it left, with little guidance, a provision that allowed
workers to bring personal grievances because of a claim "that the employee
has been unjustifiably dismissed."" In addition, the ECA markedly
expanded the jurisdiction of the specialized Employment Court that
received exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any proceedings
founded on an employment contract.12 The propriety of the Employment
Court in interpreting and enforcing the ECA had been hotly debated, but,
while there is extensive argument over the propriety of their decisions, no
one doubts that in the main it took positions that were sympathetic to the
complaints of dissatisfied employees.
9 With regard to my speaking tour of 1990, it has been said that "The main intellectual
source for the ECA can be traced directly back to the United States and almost exclusively to
one article by Richard Epstein." Ellen J. Dannin, Consummating Market-Based Labor Law
Reform in New Zealand: Context and Reconfiguration, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 267, 303 (1996).
Dannin also rightly credits PENELOPE BROOK, FREEDOM AT WORK (1990), for making the
basic case within the New Zealand Context. Id. at 303. See also Nick Wales, Professor
Richard Epstein and the New Zealand Employment Contracts Act: A Critique, 28 CAL. W.
Irr'L L.J. 27, 27 (1997).
10 Employment Contracts Act, 1991, §§ 9, 10.
1 Id. § 27(1)(a). See Anderson, supra note 6, at 119-20.
12 Employment Contracts Act, 1991, § 3(1).
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Any doubts over the proper interpretation of the ECA will not be
resolved judicially because the statute has been displaced by The
Employment Relations Act 2000,13 which totally repudiated the philosophy
behind the ECA. The ERA starts with the bland declaration that its object
is "to build productive employment relationships through the promotion of
mutual trust and confidence."'4  But far from seeing that voluntary
arrangements alone can achieve that result, it veers off in another direction
entirely by requiring, without defining, "good faith behaviour,"' s in
negotiation. In explicit reliance on an exploitation model of labor
relationships, it insists the appropriate level of employee choice can be
achieved "by acknowledging and addressing the inherent inequality of
bargaining power in employment relationships.', 16 The ERA then injects the
trade union into the center of good faith negotiations. These cover not only
the formation of the collective agreement and the resolution of disputes
under it, but also "any proposal by an employer that might impact on the
employer's employees, including a proposal to contract out work otherwise
done by the employees or to sell or transfer all or part of the employer's
business - ,,1 which may cover asset or share transactions, or only the
former.
Unlike the American situation, a New Zealand collective
bargaining agreement, moreover, does not confer any exclusive bargaining
rights on some union selected by the majority of workers within a
bargaining unit. Under the New Zealand law the duty to negotiate a
collective agreement (CA) in good faith does not require a (frequently
divisive) certification election similar to that required in the United States.
The absence of elections in turn eliminates the need to define
administratively the boundaries of the bargaining unit so as to determine
which workers are eligible to participate in the election in the first place.
Instead, the removal of this high election threshold in turn increases the
likelihood that some trade union will be able to secure a foothold against
the employer. The obligation to bargain in good faith over a CA comes into
play whenever one or more unions, one or more employers, and (only) two
or more employees express the desire to go that route. 8
The ERA offers no definition of what counts as good faith
negotiation - a point of obscurity that it shares with the NLRA.
Nonetheless, it goes on to provide - again like the NLRA - that good faith
negotiations do not necessarily require that the parties reach any final
" Public Act No. 24, 2000 (N.Z.).
14 Employment Relations Act, 2000, § 3(a).
'5 Id. § 3(a)(i).
16 Id. § 3(a)(2).
17 Id. § 4(4)(d).
1s Id. § 5 (definition of a collective agreement).
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agreement or that either side make some specific concession to the other.
But the requirement is not wholly toothless because it does impose a norm
of full disclosure of information relevant to the claims that are asserted and
denied, and, more ominously, it serves as a lever that justifies a grant of
broad ministerial authority to develop and apply "Codes of good faith," that
should take into account, but need not follow, the recommendation of a
committee appointed to develop such codes. w
This said, ERA does not quite return to the earlier regime of
compulsory industry-wide arbitration, but it certainly tilts the table in favor
of union representation. Its broad declaration states that employees have the
freedom to decide whether or not to join a union. The statute then steers
(no lesser word will do) workers toward that alternative via a number of
subsidiary provisions. Only registered unions can represent workers under
collective bargaining agreements, and these unions, but no other groups
are entitled to gain reasonable access to the work place for the purpose of
discussing union business or recruiting new members. 2 The employer must
presumptively collect union dues from salary and remit them to the union.23
In dealing with the competition for loyalty all workers are protected from
"undue influence," but while that provision is stated in neutral form, its
chief purpose is to make it impermissible for employers to offer employees
inducements to remain outside the union fold. In contrast, the flow of
information from unions to workers is not so limited under the ERA, but is,
to the contrary, subsidized. Thus the ERA also provides for mandatory paid
leave for workers to receive education organized by the union that varies
between five to thirty-five days.24 In part the employer can counter the
effectiveness of this provision by reducing the hourly wage rate to reflect
the loss of productivity. But the disruption of the workforce and the
possible adverse effects on morale still remain costs, even if born by
employers.
The union advantage in negotiation is then increased by several
related provisions. First, the presumption is that once one collective
agreement is in place, then for the first 30 days all workers are bound,
whether or not union members, unless they opt for some other union. 5 The
net effect is that the same employer could be faced by multiple unions. The
multiplication of unions increases the risk of competition between rival
unions, which this statute resolves in part by allocating workers who have
19 Id. §§ 35-39.
2 Id.§§7,8.
21 Id. §§ 12-18
2 Id. §§ 19-21.
2 Id.§ 55.
24 Id. §§ 70-79.
25 Id. §§ 61-63.
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not chosen any particular union to that union which represents the largest
number of employees at one time.16 Under this regime, no employer can
expect a honeymoon period in which to organize a new plant or division,
for the slender requirements for invoking the collective bargaining
mechanism negate any prospect of prolonged resistance to some union
presence within the workforce.
The structure of good faith negotiations contemplates the
possibility of bargaining to impasse, and at which point economic weapons
will be brought into play. In the event of a strike or lockout, the employer
prohibits the hiring of replacement workers and limits the use of existing
employees to perform the work of union workers.27 It also prohibits having
the workers who perform any replacement work from doing so after the
strike or lockout is over.28 In this regard, the New Zealand scheme differs
from the American system, which has always allowed the firm to hire
permanent replacement workers in the event of a strike.29
Within the American setting the costs of this doctrine are somewhat
unclear: the firm that knows it can hire replacements may be less opposed
to unionization in the first place, so that the doctrine could conceivably
increase the level of union penetration. But within the New Zealand
context, the results are likely to be chaotic if the rules are read to allow one
union to go on strike while other workers remain. Is the firm permitted to
hire new workers, up to its normal levels of recruitment, or is all hiring
stopped? If some hiring is allowed, what mechanism is used to determine
whether they are performing the permissible forms of work? And are these
various classes of nonunion workers, new and old, bound in whole or part
by any collective agreement entered into by a firm on strike? Is overtime
permitted for nonunion workers, and if so, in what amounts?
Finally, the ERA micromanages contract terms. For example, it
contains a provision that in every year after 2000, employers shall allow
employees to meet for two hours to talk about labor and other issues, at the
employer's expenseY3 By way of offset, the union has to give notice to the
employer so that it can object if the timing and composition of the meeting
compromises the ability of the employer to run his business. More
critically, the ERA contains a mandatory provision requiring employers to
let workers work up to as much as 35 days per year for labor education for
the unions.31 These provisions encompass efforts, then, by the union to put
26 Id. §§ 62(3), 63(3).
27 Id. § 97.
21 Id. § 97(5).
29 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
30 Employment Relations Act, 2000.
31 Id. § 74(1).
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their case as strongly and f'imly before the workers as possible in order to
perpetuate the system at hand.
A PRIMER ON LABOR CONTRACTS: COMPETITION VERSUS EXPLOITATION
The next question is how we evaluate the stark choices that are
presented by these two statutes. At the most general level, the question is
how best to think about these contracts within the framework of some larger
theory. In dealing with contracts, as with any other social institution, the
basic challenge is how to align the incentives that govern individual actors
so that when they act for their own, particular self-interest they advance
some larger social interest as well. By doing so, we enlist private actors in
the cause of social improvement. Under this approach, the entire structure
of legal commands - whether by way of prohibition or by way of
permission - is intended to create the appropriate match between private
and social incentives, to the extent that human institutions are capable of so
doing.
Now, looking at contracts under this particular view, what happens
when people exchange capital for labor in a particular transaction? One
standard view regards that transaction, in some sense, as exploitive, such
that a powerful and dominant party is able to impose its will upon some
hapless individual, or group of individuals, such that when the dust settles,
the employer - that is, the dominant party - is left better off by virtue of
this exchange while the individual who dealt with that employer is worse
off as consequence of that exchange.
If someone observes that kind of situation, the proper response is to
say "uh-huh, that looks to be some kind of exploitation." Now, those
people who are critical of markets, such as those who supported the ERA,
would like to find exploitation, but in the end they are unable to make out
the case. The reason is, quite simply, even if there is not a single alternative
available to someone on the face of the entire globe, why would any party
enter into a contract which they think leaves him worse off than before he
entered into it at all? Why would anyone, in other words, decide to engage
in an act of economic suicide in cooperation with another individual?
So what the defenders of intervention into labor markets are forced
to do, in effect, is to create a more subtle definition of exploitation. One
has to abandon, at least tacitly, the claim that workers are worse off when
they enter into contracts with employers. The new focus is that the
difference in size (or clout) between the employer and the employee is so
critical that the lion's share of the gain in the contract negotiation goes to
the employer - only the scraps go to the employee. The unequal rates of
return from the employment relationship, to the employer and employees
respectively from cooperative venture, favors the dominant party rather
than the other group in question.
2001]
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This somewhat more restrained definition of exploitation leads to a
series of proposals, which are supposed to allow workers to engage in
activities that allow them to capture a larger portion of the cooperative gain.
The ERA embodies these prescriptions with its hospitality to collective
bargaining, good faith obligations, and a variety of mandatory terms that
can be imposed upon these relationships. My basic position on this issue is
that even this restrained view of exploitation itself is a mistake, although for
somewhat different reasons than the first and broader view.
In order to figure out whether or not exploitation is taking place in
the second sense, one has to distinguish very simply between two different
states of the world. One state involves a single employer dealing with
multiple employees with no other place to go. Because of the employees'
limited mobility, the employer has an ability to extract some degree of
monopoly profit, just as common carriers do when they are the only firm in
a given line of business. But in the alternative second state, there are lots of
different employers, some of which are the size of General Motors and
some of which are the size of Epstein, Incorporated - that is, varying from
the thousands to only two or three or four workers. The moment that
workers have a richer menu of alternatives in the labor market, then the
claim of exploitation is misplaced. If GM is prepared to offer its workers
only a tiny sliver of the gains from his particular endeavors, another smaller
employer-rival can offer the worker a better deal, and still make himself
and the worker better off. The seas are populated not only with whales but
also with minnows.
General Motors, of course, will know this prospect is in the offing
so it is not going to sit back before taking countermeasures until it loses all
its employees. It is going to adjust its bid in anticipation of responses from
rival firms. The conclusion here is both simple and disarming. It says that
if you get an employer and employee, who both have alternatives outside of
the contract under negotiation, the arrangement they enter into will allow
both of them to be better off. In addition, each sides behavior will be
disciplined - or held in check - by virtue of the number of alternatives
available and how exercising those alternatives would affect their trading
profits.
Under this regime, the path to prosperity is not to create mandatory
terms, not to create good faith bargaining obligations, and not to create
monopoly situation of any sort. Instead, it is to simply stand aside, to let
the contracts form as people will negotiate them, and then to enforce them
in accordance with the terms by which they were written. Reform in this
context constitutes a reduction in the level of legal interference with private
arrangements. We should note that this is a theory not based upon some
artificial assumption that government intervention in private contracts is
always bad. My theory then is one which takes into account the importance
of market structure in deciding whether or not the state should intervene.
For example, if the firm is seeking to establish interconnections to the
[Vol. 33:361
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telephone industry, it will not be feasible in the long run to create a system
which has no government intervention whatsoever of any kind or sort of
description. At the very least someone might think of how to mandate
either negotiations over, or arbitration of the costs of interconnection
between two separate networks.-
THE NEw ZEALAND TRANSFORMATION
With this having been said, it is now possible to take a look at the
situation in New Zealand and to discover that all is not well within many of
the iterations of law reform. Before the 1894 legislation, New Zealand was
a highly prosperous country. By enacting a law that imposed arbitration
and reconciliation, New Zealand veered away from a competitive situation
to one that required so-called "multi-employer contract arrangements." In
this instance, a given group of employers bargain unilaterally and
collectively against a group of unionized workers. The constraints were so
powerful that any small firm within the industry that wanted to break away
from this multi-employer group were required to participate in its
settlements. Similarly, any worker who wanted to break away from a union
and negotiate separately was required to accept the benefits of "compulsory
unionization" from the opposite side. The preferred position of these two
behemoth organizations was preserved because the 1894 statute required
any new entrant into the industry to join the multi-employer association and
be bound by the terms the association had negotiated. What this did, in
effect, was to get rid of all competition - on both the management side and
labor side of any particular business.
As you might well imagine, in these kinds of powerful collective
organizations, the most likely outcome is that the dominant industry firm
will negotiate that set of terms. This not only gives the dominant firm a
productive advantage, but also hampers any innovation that other firms in
the same industry might wish to implement. So now you have not only a
huge bargaining impasse that can easily take place, but also a systematic
way to stifle innovation in all kinds of labor markets, including the entry of
new firms, with different modes of production, who are disadvantaged by
the standard form contract.
It is not, therefore, surprising that the New Zealand economy,
which was one of the most prosperous in the world at the turn of the last
century, became progressively weaker as labor markets deteriorated with
time. Not only did New Zealand weaken their economy, but they also
created an incredible series of barriers with respect to international
competition in goods and services, including high tariffs, laws, and all sorts
of dubious internal subsidies for foreign exports. This is not unrelated to
the operation of the labor market, because the operation of this multi-
32 See Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934), amended by Telecommunications
Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252 (1996).
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employer system bargaining needs the state monopoly umbrella to prevent
foreign goods produced under more favorable conditions from driving out
local production. By 1984, the cumulative weight of this massively
deformed system was driving the country towards bankruptcy. New
Zealand had a few days worth of foreign reserves left, and they were
bleeding right and left. It was a kind of a western capitalist version of East
Berlin, only it occurred several years later.
Now, once a country finds itself in that kind of condition, it must
recognize that there are going to be major changes introduced into its
system. Indeed, New Zealand was no exception to this rule. What
happened next was that the then labor-party minister, Sir Roger Douglas in
treasury, took a huge meat axe and managed to change huge portions of the
internal constitution of New Zealand. Exchange controls disappeared.
Export restraints disappeared. Tariffs were slashed. Government agencies
were privatized and sold off. In fact, when Sir Roger lectured some years
later at the University of Chicago's Business School, he announced very
simply what his strategy had been. These words are not quotation, but they
capture his gist:
I was just moving so fast, breaking so many things up that by the
time people got organized to stop me on one thing, I was done with that
one, and I was on to the next, and after a while all the rats realized it was
better to flee the ship by trying to be productive, rather than to try to hold
up the march of reform to keep their past privileges.
By promptly taking advantage of the window of opportunity, he
saved New Zealand from what would have been a major kind of
international financial and business crisis.
Now, generally speaking, it is probably easier for the most part to
start to reorganize exchange markets and international trade than it is to
tamper with the labor market. If you are dealing with transactions between
large multi-national firms, you do not quite get the capital versus labor
fervor, which can easily be inserted into employment relations. However, it
is not as though the Marxists really feel this is where they live or die. Even
though I think people really understood that there was some connection
between what happened in the international trade markets and what
happened in the domestic labor markets, they could conceptually demarcate
the two markets from each other.
Nevertheless, having gotten rid of the exchange controls, there was
still the question of how the labor markets inside New Zealand were going
to be organized. Consequently, in the period between 1984 and 1990, the
government decided to make some changes. Although I think it is hard to
believe these days, New Zealand had actually passed "pay equity" or
"comparative worth" statute by which wages were supposed to be adjusted
to reflect fairness across various trades and occupations. The nature of the
enterprise was to establish some parity of wages across dominantly male
and dominantly female occupations, so that if one knew the wage scale for
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truck drivers, it should be possible to compute the appropriate wages for
nurses. These comparisons have to be consistent both within and across
various occupations, and thus contemplate a massive concentration of
government power of wages, with enormous losses in productivity.
When I arrived in New Zealand in 1990, I took dead aim against
this statute and argued strongly for the liberalization of' labor markets,
defending with gospel fervor the contract at will by which an employer
could hire and fire anybody for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.
I also spent a good deal of time explaining that if people wanted to enter
into this sort of arrangement, although an outsider might think it arbitrary,
in many cases it provides a perfectly sensible and workable arrangement
when one understands the internal intellectual and business dynamics
driving the process. The result? Half the battle was won with the
enactment of the Employment Contract Act of 1991.
THE IMPACT OF THE ECA
The ECA was the focal point of fierce conflict in New Zealand, for
its passage had been staunchly opposed by the trade unions, and their many
supporters, including large and vocal segments of the academic community.
Most evidently, the Act worked a sea of change from the Conciliation Act
of 1894 ,a3 most obviously on the levels of unionization. The percentage of
the New Zealand employees represented by unions plummeted from
approaching 50 percent to below 20 percent, which gives ample indication
of the high stakes in setting out the parameters of bargaining
arrangements.'4 The reason for that decline was that unions could do little
to prevent employers from taking a hard line with workers who might have
otherwise wanted to negotiate through union representatives. This outcome
contrasts sharply with the American position on the subject, under which all
individually negotiated contracts, including those negotiated prior to the
adoption of the collective bargaining agreement, are without legal effect.3
Under the ECA, the union became the expendable middleman, for workers
were far less willing to pay dues to organizations that could not deliver
them some monopoly wage premium.
33 Employment Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1894; See O'KIamE & FARRANDs,
supra note 6.
34 See Statistics New Zealand, Labor Market Statistics 1999 - Reference Report, at
http://www.stats.gov.nz [hereinafter Labor Statistics]. In 1993 the total number of
employees equally 1,160,600 of which about 409,000 were unionized, for a 35 percent
figure. In 1998 the numbers were 307,000 unionized out of an employee base of 1.389,000
for a 22 percent figure. See also ERA Info: The Report on Employment Relations in New
Zealand, Employment Relations Service, Dept. of Labour, New Zealand (July 2001), at 12,
available at www.ers.dol.govt.nz.
35 See J.I. Case v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (unfair labor practice under § 8(5),
imposing the duty to bargain collectively).
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The decline in union membership, however, was not accompanied
by a decline in overall wages or employment levels. To the contrary
between 1991 and 2000 overall, around 300,000 new jobs were created,
which counts as a huge increase in a country of only 3,600,000 people.
Unemployment rates dropped from 11 percent in early 1992, shortly after
passage of the ECA, to 6 percent in 2000.3 That expansion in labor force
participation is rendered still more impressive in light of the fact that
overall wage levels moved up during this period. To be sure, during the
first two years after the passage of the ECA, about 10 percent of workers
received lower pay than before. But that is just what should be expected,
for workers who had commanded large monopoly advantages under the
older order could not preserve them in a more competitive environment.
By the same token, once the initial corrections had been made overall wage
levels went up, typically by between 2 and 5 percent under collective
agreements.
In this period, productivity increased as well. Thus one estimate
holds that the average growth in labor productivity increased from 1.1% per
year during the 1984-1993 period to 1.9% during the 1993-1998 period.37
Most noticeably, strikes were sharply reduced in number and severity. That
change was doubtless correlated with the eclipse of collective bargaining.
The ECA brought about a precipitate 88 percent decline in multi-employer
settlements and a rapid increase (in the private sector only) of single
employer settlement. It did not have any significant effect one way or the
other on the distribution of income; nor did it lead to a reduction in the
percentage of the workforce holding permanent jobs. The rate of reduction
in unemployment was about the same for the Maori as for the general
population; it was slightly more dramatic (from a higher base) for workers
from the Pacific Islands. The percentage of women in the workforce
increased more rapidly than that of men.
This evidence negates any dire predictions of industrial doom from
unionized markets. But by the same token their show of steady
improvement has been gradual, not transformative. But that outcome is just
what should be expected. Natural experiments are always messy. Any
effort to understand the impact of this Act on employment has to
disaggregate it from at least three other factors.
36 See New Zealand Business Roundtable, Submission on Employment Relations Bill
(May 2000) at 6-7, available at http://www.nzbr.org.nz [hereinafter NZBR Submission).
37 See Diewert E. & Lawrence, D., "Measuring New Zealand's Productivity," Treasury
Working Paper 99/5, New Zealand Treasury, Wellington, available at
http://www.treasury.govt.nzlworkingpapers. For summary of results, see NZBR Submission,
supra note 36 (noting similar differentials in other studies).
38 For an account, see Harbridge & Crawford, supra note 7, at 249-251 tbls.
39 NZBR Submission, supra note 36, at 10. See also Labor Statistics, supra note 34.
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First, wholly apart from the passage of the ECA, the position of
local monopolies, including labor monopolies, was necessarily
compromised by the comprehensive reforms in world trade and financial
markets in the 1984 to 1990 period. Any removal of trade barriers and
subsidies, the floating of exchange rates - none of which have as yet been
displaced in New Zealand by protectionist legislation - necessarily reduce
the value of any local monopoly, including a union monopoly over labor
supply. Therefore, wholly apart from the changes in employment law, we
should expect to see a reduction in labor influence, not uniformly across the
board, but over time especially in import sensitive industries. In the short
run, the new external competition is likely to reduce wages, but at the same
time it will increase productivity and reduce prices. Overall the standard of
living should improve, but not instantly or equally for all people. These
theoretical variations are, however, not captured in the reported data.
Second, the effectiveness of any labor reform must be discounted
by perceived uncertainty of its durability. Decisions to change the
organization of a workforce are not simply made for a single slice in time.
Hiring decisions have a key temporal dimension, for investments in the
work force have to be matched up with those for capital equipment and
brand development as part of some long-term strategic plans. The
willingness to expand a workforce today - say, by hiring high-risk workers
- will be dulled for an employer who fears that it will be forced to retain
and manage those new workers in a heavily regulated environment
tomorrow.
The ECA was a legislative enactment vulnerable to repeal the day it
was passed, and it was repealed in the guise of reform nine years by a
closely divided New Zealand government. The deep cleavage in public
sentiment gave ample warning that a rise in populist or labor political
sentiment could usher in a massive re-regulation of labor markets. In light
of that possibility, established firms should be expected to cut back on
expansion plans, and foreign firms should be expected to be less willing to
start new operations or expand ongoing operations in New Zealand markets
if they think that the country would revert to its bad old habits. The
traditional British commercial practices were not always elegant, but so
long as the system had the reputation of respecting vested rights, it could
count on receiving a steady stream of investment. Stability matters.
Owing to New Zealand track record, however, the ECA had to be
perceived in part as a Venus-fly trap that would snap shut after the foreign
investment was made. The very fact that outsiders think that reforms will
not be durable will contribute to their failures. The only silver lining is that
poor-statutes like the ERA also have short half-lives, which in part mutes
their downward draft.40 But do not think that this problem is confined to
40 Yet even here the matter is difficult for today New Zealand operates through coalition
governments, which make it harder to get discrete changes in policy, which in turn reduces
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New Zealand. The United States has not been immune to changes in
policy, sometimes through bait and switch operations. The federal
government actively recruited large corporations to join its pension
guarantee programs with the explicit promise that they could withdraw at
will. But the moment firms started to exercise those rights the trap snapped
shut, with the implicit blessing of the Supreme Court. We shall not see a
second such program.
Third, the passage of the ECA did not bring about a total
deregulation of labor markets, even if it did sharply curtail labor's clout in
collective bargaining. It also consolidated and strengthened its extensive
human rights laws, prohibiting discrimination on multiple grounds;4 it kept
and expanded the jurisdiction of its specialized employment court;4 and it
retained a host of pension, workers' compensation, health and safety
mandates in labor markets. Most importantly, New Zealand retained its
unjust dismissal law," which, after the Act, was enforced by a specialized
New Zealand labor court,4 ? created and expanded for this particular
purpose. Not surprisingly, the number of complaints soared from around
600 in 1990 to about 5,000 in 1998. The ECA did not introduce a regime of
voluntary contract.
These unjust dismissal provisions are critical because they preclude
any employer from hiring and firing at will. (There are - rightly - no
analogous provisions that create a parallel wrong of unjust quitting.) If
there is no union representation, and no restriction on "at will" employment
relationships, a labor force will often have a high turnover rate in response
to changes in technology, market forces and a firm's own strategic plan.
Many workers may be reassigned or laid off, but many of those will be
hired somewhere else. In steady state, we should expect, and welcome,
some level of labor turnover, even if it is impossible in the abstract to pin
down its ideal level.
The emergence from a system of heavy unionization meant that the
labor markets were not in steady state. Quite the contrary, there was under
deregulation doubtless a pent up demand on both sides of the market to
shift jobs. Some workers would leave positions when stripped of the
monopoly rents they accrued to unionization. Some employers would
redesign their operations and seek to hire a work force consistent with their
the likelihood that the laws will be subject to radical revision or reversal. But only time will
tell for sure.
41 Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
42 Human Rights Act 1993, 2 Stat. 82 (N.Z.), available at http://rangi.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/gpacts/public/text/ 1993/an/082.html.
43 Employment Contracts Act, 1991, § 3. See O'KIEFE & FARRANDs, supra note 6.
44 Employment Contracts Act, 1991, § 27(a). See O'KmEa & FARRANDS, supra note 6.
45 See O'Kamm & FARRANDS, supra note 6.
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new business plan. That is exactly what happened in New Zealand, which
experienced a high rate of turnover shortly after the adoption of the ECA.
In fact, any worker that enjoyed the benefit of monopoly protection could
easily have done worse under the new regulatory scheme and soon came to
resent it, which could help explain the spurt in unjust dismissal claims after
the advent of the act. The level of legal activity was doubtless increased
when employees perceived that they have the advantage of a specialized
tribunal.
These are also trumpeted because of their expertise, but they should
fall under suspicion because of their bias. Professor Andrew Morriss,
among others, has written about the track record of this and other
specialized courts, and he has delivered a mixed verdict as to their
institutional efficacy.46 On matters of patent and tax law, the demand for
technical knowledge is so high that some resort to specialized tribunals is
appropriate. In my opinion, labor contracts do not fall into that select group
of technical issues. Interpreting and enforcing these contracts is not all that
different from similar activities with any commercial or business contracts.
The judges and lawyers have to be able to read the contract language in
light of the background business arrangements. Any lawyer who knows
something about the sale of goods or the formation of partnerships is likely
to do better in understanding labor contracts than lawyers who have
immersed themselves in employment contracts for all their lives.
Consequently, I see no need for a specialized dispute resolution system for
these contractual issues.
The danger here is evident. Specialized courts, while praised for
their ostensible expertise, are dangerous because of the ability of a
determined legislature to pack them. A specialized court allows a party to
put their pigeons in place so that the folks who are on that court can have a
systematic buy, pushing them in one direction or another. Indeed New
Zealand's labor court was both strong, and pro-employee, so new life was
breathed into these unjust dismissal claims simply by virtue of the fact that
there was a systematic framework. Although these verdicts for the
employees were often reversed by the appellate courts, every experienced
lawyer knows that a victory at trial creates leverage on appeal. Thus, New
Zealand labor law was buffeted by two forces moving in opposite
directions, as the liberalization from the unions was matched by increased
judicial activity with unjust dismissal cases. The question is how these two
influences sum in labor markets. Here, my guess is that the overall estimate
shows that the ECA was a positive contribution on net, but the conflicting
trends require a modification of caution on the issue.
46 Andrew P. Morriss, Specialized Labor and Employment Institutions in New Zealand
and the United States, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 145 (1997).
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THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 2000
Now that the Employment Relations Act of 2000 has supplanted, as
of October of 2000, the ECA, what is its impact? Here the time is too short
to have a definitive analysis, but some initial findings are in. The public
response to the Act seems to be guardedly sympathetic, and union
membership has not climbed dramatically, even though there has been a
sharp increase in the number of days lost to strikes - 441 days for a three
month period under the ECA in the spring of 2000 to 6069 days in the like
period for 2001. 47 The internal organizational design of the ERA, however,
presents troublesome features that make me long for the American National
Labor Relations Act. The precise difficulties in implementation of this
broad scheme are impossible to resolve in the abstract, for the ERA, with its48
good faith standard, is often loosely drawn and will doubtless prove
vulnerable to the vagaries of administrative enforcement and judicial
interpretation. It thus makes an appeal to the familiar misguided and
confused claims about inequality of bargaining power, good faith
negotiation, and freedom of association that have long bedeviled labor
regulations elsewhere. Like the American Statute, the ERA does not
compel either side to make concessions to the other - for otherwise each
would be required to accept the terms of its opponents. 49 But it does make
the niceties of negotiation matter, so that "take it or leave offers," (of the
kind found in every supermarket) become suspect. The level of stylized
bargaining will increase, and so will the need to observe procedural
niceties. In perfect competition transactions costs are driven toward zero
while the velocity of transaction increases. Under collective bargaining the
transaction costs go up and the rate of exchange goes down - a bad trade all
around.
In a sense the situation in New Zealand is, I fear, still worse than
that under the NLRA because of differences in the enforcement of the
collective bargaining regimes. The NLRA creates the National Labor
Relations Board, which is a quasi-judicial operation designed to resolve
unfair labor practice disputes, contractual disputes, and all other issues that
arise under the NLRA. In New Zealand, however, the minister is given
very broad discretion to enter and to propose codes of industry conduct,
which are in turn designed to implement the good faith duties embodied
under the ERA.
The new regime brings back shades of New Zealand's 1894
Conciliation Act, with its destructive multi-employer bargaining system.
One way to return to industry-wide bargaining is for the minister to propose
47 See Deborah Hill Cone, Increasing strikes fail to change public's sunny view of ERA,
THE NAT'L Bus. REv., Oct. 12,2001.
48 Employment Relations Act, 2000, § 4(1)(a).
49 Id.
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a code of good faith negotiation. That norm would bind every firm in a
particular industry and thus introduce industry-wide cartelization via the
back-door imposition of minimum terms. The statute also micromanages
the substantive provisions of employment contracts. The combination is
likely to prove very destructive.
The larger lesson that one should learn from the passage of the
ERA is not intellectual but political. The fight over labor organizations is a
fight between two visions: competition and exploitation. The former sees
competition in labor markets as a dynamic source of improvement for all
participants in the market. The disappointed job seeker in one case benefits
from the range of alternatives that are opened by the greater willingness of
firms to enter labor markets in the first place. Monopoly arrangements cut
down on entry and experimentation in labor markets, just as it does in
product markets. The standard position, which is deeply suspicious of
special pleading, sees nothing "special" about labor markets and thus
applies to them the same principles that are used in structuring contracts for
everything from the sale of a loaf of bread to the sale of a corporation. No
matter what the context, those principles only justify the state sponsorship
of monopoly in limited circumstances, as a precondition to public order - as
with the system of law enforcement - or as an inducement to innovation, as
with patents and copyrights. Happily, labor markets need no special
tweaking to become and remain highly competitive. But they are
regrettably exposed to concerted political action that can make them rigid,
unresponsive, and conflict-ridden. Such are the social consequences of the
alternative political vision when the political rhetoric behind labor law sees
exploitation in competition and just redress in protectionist rules.
The ERA responds to this fundamental political choice by
embracing the latter vision. My prediction is that it will prove difficult to
tame the powerful economic forces that legislation such as the ERA
unleashes. The question of how this, or any other, legislation will alter the
balance of power is, however, hard to predict in the abstract. On this matter
the point of durability works, as it were, in reverse. The trade union that
thinks that this round of law reform will be of short duration will reduce
accordingly its efforts to gain dominance in the workplace. If New Zealand
remains open to international competition, then the domestic power of
unions will be blunted by economic forces from without, no matter what the
ERA provides. But if the forces that secured passage of the ERA conclude
that open borders have undercut the effectiveness of the union campaign,
then the ripple effects from the ERA could undo the fundamental trade and
financial reforms spearheaded by Roger Douglas during the 1980s. The
intellectual arguments on this issue remain what they were before the
statute was passed. Its economic consequences will prove, I fear, a graver
concern.
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